The Right to Self-Determination and its Implication on the Sovereign Right of States: The Inconsistent Application of International Standards for Independence with Respect to Kosovo by Sasich, Angelina M.
THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND ITS 
IMPLICATION ON THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT OF 
STATES: THE INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR 
INDEPENDENCE WITH RESPECT TO KOSOVO 
Angelina M. Sasich*
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 495
I. KOSOVO: SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE CLASH WITH 
SOVEREIGNTY .................................................................................... 497
II. KOSOVO’S FAILURE IN PASSING THE MONTEVIDEO “TEST” FOR 
INDEPENDENCE .................................................................................. 502
III. KOSOVO’S FAILURE TO FULFILL ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS SET 
OUT BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY’S DECLARATION FOR 
EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES ........................................................... 505
IV. CANADA’S CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION TO SECESSION WITH 
RESPECT TO QUEBEC ......................................................................... 510
V. CHINA’S ACTIONS THREATENED TAIWAN’S RIGHT TO SELF-
DETERMINATION ................................................................................ 514
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 518
INTRODUCTION 
The process by which a people forge a path towards independence begins 
with their right to self-determination. Self-determination has been defined 
as the “determination by a group of people with the same social, ethnic, and 
cultural background inhabiting one area, or sometimes a group of people 
living in a territory within a state, of its own political future, including 
establishing a state of its own by a referendum or other methods.”1 It is the 
right given to people to hold referendums and pursue their independence. 
Once the people have established a desire to exercise independence through 
self-determination, they first must fulfill the criteria of a state, specifically 
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the “four qualifications prescribed in the Montevideo Convention.”2 The 
next requirement, that states must declare themselves as states to the 
international community, “is derived from international custom . . . . [and] 
may take a formal or an informal form.”3 However, without this declaration, 
a state’s assertion of independence will be unprofitable since it cannot 
expect the international community to recognize it as sovereign if it does 
not see itself as a sovereign nation.  
Once a secessionist region has fulfilled the criteria for a state and has 
made it known to the international community that it is seeking 
independence, the sovereign right of its governing state is implicated. The 
right of a sovereign state to exercise control is threatened by the right of 
self-determination. The two are forced to co-exist, however, not 
harmoniously. The tension is most visible when the international 
community applies inconsistent methods of implementation with respect to 
standards set forth in the Montevideo Convention. When they are not 
applied equally amongst the States seeking independence, they create 
unpredictable results and do not enforce the Convention’s intention of 
creating a solid set of guidelines. As a result of this unpredictability, states 
are not encouraged to alter their behavior to fit the guidelines. In contrast, 
states rely on the international community’s interpretation of when the 
standards should be applied and when other forces come into play. 
The political implications of the granting of Kosovo’s independence are 
not discounted in this article because, as law Professor Christopher J. 
Borgen states, “Kosovo presents a quintessential ‘tough case,’ 
demonstrating the ways in which political interests of States affect how the 
international law is given effect.”4 The major thrust of this paper is the 
analysis of the independence of Kosovo and adherence (or lack of) to the 
standards set forth in international law. A brief comparison and analysis will 
be made to the international community’s denial of independence for 
Quebec and Taiwan, since these two situations have been previously 
analyzed and documented in detail by other authors.  
In its Advisory Opinion of July 22, 2010 regarding Kosovo’s 
independence, the International Court of Justice stated that “the Court 
considers that general international law contains no applicable prohibition 
of declarations of independence.”5 The Court further stated that “[d]ebates 
 2. Id. at 971.  
 3. Id.
 4. Christopher J. Borgen, Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: Self-
Determination, Secession and Recognition, ASIL INSIGHTS (Feb. 29, 2008), 
http://www.asil.org/insights080229.cfm. See generally Ian Brownlie & C. J. Apperley, 
Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: Memorandum on the International Law Aspects, 49 INT’L & COMP.
L. Q. 878 (2000) (discussing whether intervention by NATO states in Kosovo is appropriate 
under international law).  
 5. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 84 (Jul. 22).  
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regarding the extent of the right of self-determination and the existence of 
any right of ‘remedial succession,’ however, concern the right to separate 
from a State. . . . [T]hat issue is beyond the scope of the question posed by 
the General Assembly.”6
I.  KOSOVO: SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE CLASH WITH 
SOVEREIGNTY
The ideas of sovereignty and self-determination for Kosovo have long 
been a bone of contention between the Kosovo Albanians and the former 
Yugoslavia (now Serbia). This type of struggle can be pinned as “[t]he 
underlying cause of the tragedy of Yugoslavia.”7 However, this struggle 
alone could not have led to the breakup of the region. It is in fact the “ad 
hoc rejection of the principle of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
states.”8 Specifically, “where the territorial integrity of the state is violated 
and territorial secessions are encouraged, it leads to more demands by other 
ethnic or ideological groups for the same right of secession leading to more 
violence.”9 Thus, the concern arises that once the sovereignty of a state is 
violated, manipulation of the system by groups seeking secession becomes a 
grave possibility. For example, how would the international community 
react if illegal immigrants in Arizona or Texas became the majority and 
declared secession from the United States?  
When the United Nations General Assembly enacted Resolution 2649, 
the meaning behind the concept of “self-determination” was unclear.10 In 
the Resolution, it notes the concern “that many peoples are still denied the 
right to self-determination and are still subject to colonial and alien 
domination.”11 Yet, there does not seem to be any mention of what 
constitutes this type of domination. It achieves the “speedy granting of 
independence to colonial countries and peoples” without setting the 
criteria.12 Self-determination is recalled in later Resolutions, such as 2787 
(XXVI) and 2955 (XXVII).13 Yet, the General Assembly reminds member 
States that it is “mindful that interference in the internal affairs of States is a 
violation of the Charter and can pose a serious threat to the maintenance of 
 6. Id. ¶ 83. 
 7. Raju G. C. Thomas, Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Secession: Principles 
and Practice, in YUGOSLAVIA UNRAVELED: SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-DETERMINATION,
INTERVENTION 3, 16 (Raju G. C. Thomas ed., 2003).  
 8. Id. (emphasis added).  
 9. Id. at 16-17. 
 10. G.A. Res. 2649 (XXV), at 73, U.N. Doc. A/8163 (Nov. 30, 1970).  
 11. Id.
 12. Id.
 13. See G.A. Res. 2787 (XXVI), U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, U.N. Doc. 
A/8543 (Dec. 6, 1971); see also G.A. Res. 2955 (XXVII), U.N. Doc. A/8936 (Dec. 12, 
1972).  
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peace.”14 If the General Assembly is mindful that interference in the internal 
affairs of a state is a violation of the Charter, and is a threat to peace, then it 
becomes questionable why a right of self-determination, without guidelines, 
should be enforced.  
It appears enforcement of this principle in Kosovo is the true purpose 
behind the concept of self-determination, as envisioned by the General 
Assembly. The secession of Kosovo from Serbia has clouded an already 
undefined theory. The U.N. Charter leaves “self-determination” ambiguous 
with one of its purposes stated in Article 1: “[t]o develop friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples.”15 It has made it more difficult to distinguish a 
victim from an aggressor. Within the Kosovo province, “[t]he promise of 
external support for independence encouraged the Albanians of Kosovo to 
provoke the Serbian security forces into committing human rights violations 
in order to invite NATO military intervention.” 16 This concern has been 
addressed, to a similar extent, by Satish Nambiar in the article Reflections 
on the Yugoslav Wars: A Peacekeeper’s Perspective.17 Specifically, because 
the Kosovo problem was ignored in the Dayton Accord, it was unavoidable 
that “Albanian extremist elements . . . would displace the moderate 
elements in Kosovo, assert themselves, and provoke the Yugoslav 
authorities into a heavy-handed response.”18 The blurring of distinctions 
between aggressor and victim is even more frightening when the population 
of Kosovo consisted of “75 percent ethnic Albanians and 12.5 percent 
Serbs” in 1981.19 Thus, fitting a majority population into a victim category 
becomes more difficult to accept. 
The support of the secessionist movement in Kosovo is deeply troubling 
when considered as an act of self-determination since there have been 
concerns about the majority population oppressing minorities within the 
province. The General Assembly even addresses this when it recognizes 
“the frequent instances of harassment, periodic kidnapping and murder of 
ethnic Serb, Roma and other minorities of Kosovo by ethnic Albanian 
extremists.”20 This Resolution was adopted in 2000, the same year that the 
Albanian population in Kosovo reached 85.3 percent.21
 14. G.A. Res. 2787 (XXVI), supra note 13, at 83 (emphasis added). 
 15. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.  
 16. Thomas, supra note 7, at 34 (emphasis added).  
 17. See generally Satish Nambiar, Reflections on the Yugoslav Wars: A 
Peacekeeper’s Perspective, in YUGOSLAVIA UNRAVELED: SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-
DETERMINATION, INTERVENTION, supra note 7.
 18. Id. at 357. 
 19. Id. at 345 (emphasis added).  
 20. G.A. Res. 54/183, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 54th Sess., Agenda Item 116(c), U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/54/183, at 2 (Feb. 29, 2000).  
 21. Id.; see World Bank, Kosovo—Living Standards measurement Survey 2000, 
http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.phpcatalog/77/variable/V949 (last visited Nov. 25, 
2010).  
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Just a year prior to the General Assembly’s recognition of violence by 
Kosovo’s dominant population, Rambouillet, France hosted an international 
conference on the Kosovo issue. At the conference, “American officials 
drafted an agreement that largely favored the Albanians—demanding a 
referendum on independence after three years and free passage for NATO 
troops throughout all of Yugoslavia.”22 The process by which this 
agreement was reached has been criticized as a “violation of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of International Treaties.”23 Specifically, 
Rambouillet has been criticized as “a farce enacted to justify . . . NATO 
intervention in the form of missile and air attacks on Kosovo and other areas 
of Yugoslavia.”24 Thus, it would appear that the process undertaken to 
ensure the independence of Kosovo was a direct violation of the General 
Assembly’s own guidelines. The General Assembly “[u]rges all States to 
respect the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States and 
the sovereign right of peoples to determine their political, economic, and 
social system.”25 The interference by NATO violated the sovereign right of 
the people of Serbia to determine their political fate. In fact, it forced the 
state to submit to the Rambouillet secessionist agreement.  
Years before the secessionist agreement was adopted by Serbia and 
Kosovo, the United States, a member state of NATO, made important 
statements regarding the situation in Kosovo. In a Department of State Press 
Statement from May 24, 1991, it stated that it “will not encourage or reward 
secession . . . . Yugoslavia’s external or internal borders should not be 
changed unless by peaceful consensual means.”26 However, in 2008 the 
United States gave its support to the secessionist movement. It is difficult to 
understand why one of the most prominent NATO states changed its 
opinion, from 1991 to 2008, to support secession and the bombing of a 
sovereign state.  
A concern specified in the Department of State Press Statement was the 
process of elections in Kosovo. Specifically, “[t]he holding of free and fair 
elections, like the free flow of information, is a measure of a government’s 
 22. Alan J. Kuperman, Transnational Causes of Genocide, or How the West 
Exacerbates Ethnic Conflict, in YUGOSLAVIA UNRAVELED: SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-
DETERMINATION, INTERVENTION, supra note 7, at 66 (emphasis added). See Marc Weller, 
The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo, 75 INT’L AFF. 211 (1999) (detailing one author’s 
interpretation of the process involved in the Rambouillet agreement).  
 23. Nambiar, supra note 17, at 357.  
 24. Id. See Jason R. Struble & Richard A.C. Alton, The Legacy of Operation Allied 
Force: A Reflection on its Legality Under United States and International Law, 20 MICH. ST.
INT’L L. REV. 293, 307-09 (2012) for a discussion of how military force was used to promote 
Kosovo independence.  
 25. G.A. Res. 46/130, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/130 (Dec. 17, 1991).  
 26. Press Release, Dep’t of State, Dep’t of State Press Statement (May 24, 1991), in
THE KOSOVO CONFLICT: A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY THROUGH DOCUMENTS 49, 50 (Philip E. 
Auerswald & David P. Auerswald eds., 2000) (emphasis added). 
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commitment to a democratic political process.”27 This is a concern that is 
also shared by the General Assembly.28 However, the General Assembly 
emphasizes that states should not provide any type of “overt or covert 
support for political parties or groups and from taking actions to undermine 
the electoral processes in any country.”29 Thus, to provide an analogy, 
Serbia and other states may not provide support for any political party in the 
Kosovo region and may not try to undermine the electoral process. If the 
electoral process is respected, then the need for intervention by other States 
is unnecessary.  
The electoral process in Kosovo was not obstructed. Following a 
referendum that was held from September 26th to the 30th, a statement was 
made by the provincial assembly that “the Assembly of the republic of 
Kosova declares the initiative a success.”30 In this election 87.01% of the 
inhabitants of Kosovo participated, of which nearly all were ethnic 
Albanians.31 It also notes that there were “1,500 polling locations,” an 
indicator that the electoral process was set in motion.32 Already the republic 
renamed itself “Kosova,” and declared itself to “be a sovereign and 
independent republic.”33 The results of the Referendum speak for 
themselves—that there was no obstruction by Serbia. There was no need for 
support or involvement by other States to ensure the fairness of the electoral 
process in Kosovo.  
Following the electoral process, the European Community considered 
the Kosovo independence issue. The European Community “refused to 
consider the request for recognition as an independent state” due to the 
constitutional principles of the former Yugoslavia.34 The constitutional 
principle of 1943 that governed the European Community’s refusal stated 
that “the status of [a] republic should be reserved for nations (narodi) as 
opposed to nationalities (narodnosti).”35 This is relevant to show that the 
Kosovar Albanians did not fit within the constitutional interpretation of a 
people that were eligible to gain independence through self-determination. 
Following from this, the “Kosovar Albanians were thus a nationality 
because they presumably had their homeland in Albania.”36 The 
Constitutional Declaration created by Kosovar Albanians declared that they 
 27. Id. at 51.  
 28. G.A. Res. 46/130, supra note 25. 
 29. Id. ¶ 6. 
 30. Press Release, Republic of Kosova, Statement by the Assembly of the Republic 
of Kosova (Oct. 19, 1991), in THE KOSOVO CONFLICT: A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY THROUGH 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 26, at 59. 
 31. Id.
 32. Id.
 33. Id.
 34. Richard Caplan, International diplomacy and the crisis in Kosovo, 74 INT’L AFF.
745, 748 (1998).
 35. Id.
 36. Id.
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were “the majority of the population and one of the most numerous peoples 
of Yugoslavia, as well as the Serbs and others living in Kosova, [and] are 
considered a nation-people and not a nationality (national minority).”37 If a 
group is not a minority and considers itself numerous within the governing 
State, then justification by self-determination is a weak argument. 
If a group is a majority within an area, it has dominant control within 
that area. In Kosovo, Albanians consisted of a majority of the population. 
That same population articulated its position clearly in the Constitutional 
Declaration. The Kosovar Albanians did not feel that they were a minority 
within the greater State of Yugoslavia. The legal principles of self-
determination cannot apply to every group in the world that wants to 
separate. Self-determination cannot apply to every situation because it will 
only lead to greater border disputes, problems with national identities, and 
violence. Self-determination should, therefore, not be a loosely used 
justification for secession.  
The doctrine of self-determination itself has been criticized by 
international scholars as lacking “any firm foundation, floating as if it were 
in midair.”38 The lack of standards is evident since its supporters advocate a 
position that is in direct contradiction with rational ideas of self-
determination. Specifically, they argue “that it should be identified with 
majority rule,” an idea synonymous with a nation; yet, this is not even 
articulated in the U.N. Charter, Article 5, which “carefully avoids 
specifying that this right is vested in nations.”39 Thus, the definition of 
“majority rule” or what gives a group the right to demand secession by self-
determination remains unclear.  
The lack of specificity by the U.N. Charter, Article 5, on the subject of 
self-determination leaves the doctrine open to interpretation within the legal 
community. However, interpretation turns into a double-edged sword when 
it involves international disputes. Interpretation of disputes will always lead 
to criticism by some member of the international community. If one state is 
granted independence, then another state will require the same approval. 
However, if the other state is not granted independence and secession, then 
a lack of trust in the international political system results. It is an inevitable 
result that is the consequence of a lack of standards articulated when self-
 37. Press Release, Kos. Assembly, Constitutional Declaration Adopted by the Kos. 
Assembly (July 2, 1990), in THE KOSOVO CONFLICT: A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY THROUGH 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 26 at 44 (emphasis added).  
 38. SABRINA P. RAMET, THE LIBERAL PROJECT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF EAST CENTRAL EUROPE 50 (2007). 
 39. Id. at 50-51. “Majority rule, in the western world, assumes that the forces for 
cohesion are stronger than those for separation so that, in any majority decision, the 
legitimate interests of the minority may be presumed to have influenced and modified 
majority will, at least to the point where the minority does not reject or rebel.” Aleksander 
W. Rudzinski, Majority Rule vs. Great Power Agreement in the United Nations, 9 INT’L
ORG. 366, 370 (1955).  
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determination was accepted as a legal concept. Based on the analysis, this 
deficiency has led to the belief that the approval of secessionist movements 
is based on a lack of foundation.  
II.  KOSOVO’S FAILURE IN PASSING THE MONTEVIDEO “TEST” FOR 
INDEPENDENCE
The legal requirements for statehood are set forth in the Montevideo 
Convention of 1933, an agreement that has been accepted as customary 
international law.40 It remains the primary source for the determination of 
statehood and is even taught in law schools as such. The requirements are 
laid out in four points, “[t]he state as a person of international law should 
possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined 
territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with other 
states.”41 Therefore, in order for Kosovo to be recognized as a legitimate, 
independent state, it would have to fulfill all of the Montevideo 
Convention’s requirements. Anything less than full compliance with the 
recognized standards would be reason to decline its application for 
independence.  
Additional requirements for new states seeking independence were 
created and adopted in the European Community’s Declaration on the 
“Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the 
Soviet Union.”42 The requirements iterated that new states act with: 
[R]espect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the 
commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter 
of Paris, especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human 
rights; 
[G]uarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in 
accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the 
CSCE; 
[R]espect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed 
by peaceful means and by common agreement; 
 40. MONTEVIDEO CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES, Dec. 26, 
1933, 49 Stat. 3097,165 L.N.T.S. 19. See ERROL MENDES,                                   
STATEHOOD AND PALESTINE FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLE 12(3) OF THE ICC STATUTE 2, 2 
(2010) for a discussion on how the Montevideo Convention is a part of customary 
international law. 
 41. Id. art. 1.  
 42. Declaration on the “Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern 
Europe and in the Soviet Union,” Dec. 16, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 1485, 1487 [hereinafter 
Declaration] (emphasis added). 
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[A]cceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and 
nuclear non-proliferation as well as to security and regional stability; 
[C]ommitment to settle by agreement, including where appropriate by 
recourse to arbitration, all questions concerning State succession and 
regional disputes. 
The community and its Member States will not recognise entities which 
are the result of aggression. They would take account of the effects of 
recognition on neighbouring States.43
Taking the Montevideo Convention requirements into account first, 
Kosovo does not fulfill all four points. It does contain a “permanent 
population” of individuals who reside in the area, granted the entire 
population is not of the same ethnicity. This in and of itself poses problems 
because the entire population was not in favor of the secessionist 
movement. It poses concerns of what would happen to the minority group 
once total independence is granted. It creates the unfortunate reality that the 
minority group that is left in the secessionist region will be oppressed and 
discriminated against. Freedom of speech and expression will be limited in 
order to silence minority opposition. This is an unfortunate result that is not 
always contemplated when granting independence.  
The next requirement, that there exist a “defined territory,” is evident in 
this case. Kosovo has long been considered an autonomous region. 
However, there is concern by international scholars that when secession 
occurs in a country, the “former internal boundaries of the state, whether 
they are called provinces, ‘states,’ or ‘republics,’ cannot automatically 
become the boundaries of the new state.”44 Thus, when Kosovo seceded 
from Serbia in 2008, the possibility exists that it will divide into two 
regions. It would involve partitioning Kosovo into two parts, where the 
northern section would be under Serbian control and the southern region 
would be under Albanian control.45 This shows that although there may 
have been a defined territory when independence was granted, the strong 
cultural differences in the region could lead to a further division. This is a 
likely scenario since it has already occurred in other contexts: in 1992, when 
Northern Ireland separated from Ireland and when Bengal and Punjab 
divided after Pakistan’s secession from India in 1947.46 Therefore, Kosovo 
is not unified enough to retain the same “defined territory” that it held when 
it seceded.  
 43. Id. (emphasis added).  
 44. Thomas, supra note 7, at 20.  
 45. Caplan, supra note 34, at 759-60.  
 46. Thomas, supra note 7, at 20. See Roger Mac Ginty, Orla T. Muldoon & Neil 
Ferguson, No War, No Peace: Northern Ireland after the Agreement, 28 POL. PSYCHOL. 1 
(2007); see also O. H. K. Spate, Geographical Aspects of the Pakistan Scheme, 102 
GEOGRAPHICAL J. 125 (1943).  
504 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 20:2
The greatest failure in fulfilling the Montevideo Convention’s 
requirements for statehood is in the third requirement, that of a new state’s 
“government.” In order to have a functioning government that is able to 
respond to the demands of a new state, it must be stable. Kosovo’s 
government has been anything but stable. There have been numerous groups 
that governed the province, and none have consistently held power. For 
instance, prior to the conflict, the Serbian government was active in 
Kosovo. Following this, the Albanian extremist group known as the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) took control. This group was “[t]he proximate 
cause of the 1999 Kosovo conflict.”47 This is the same group that was 
recognized to be a threat to security. The KLA’s leading members were 
considered to be “‘an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national 
security and foreign policy of the United States’” by former President 
George W. Bush in an Executive Order signed July 2001.48 The KLA was 
influential for a number of years and it was only until 2000 that a change in 
leadership occurred when Ibrahim Rugova, an Albanian leader of the 
moderate party, was elected.49 However, the reality that an extremist party 
was able to gain enough control and support to be in power in Kosovo for a 
period of time should have been a red flag that Kosovo did not have a stable 
government. The Montevideo Convention required that all four factors be 
fulfilled, including the requirement for a “government.” The failure of this 
requirement alone should have stopped the process for granting 
independence to the unstable region.  
In an article written by author Charles A. Kupchan in 2005, the political 
situation in Kosovo is illustrated as unstable, even after Rugova took 
power.50 Particularly, the “[p]olitical and legal institutions had yet to 
mature, stymied by infighting among political parties, crime and corruption, 
and patronage systems deeply embedded in the clannish structure of 
Albanian society.”51 By this description, the political and legal system is to 
be controlled by the majority Albanian population and will disregard the 
minority populations. This shows the government’s instability, just three 
 47. Kelly M. Greenhill, The Use of Refugees as Political and Military Weapons in 
the Kosovo Conflict, in YUGOSLAVIA UNRAVELED: SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-DETERMINATION,
INTERVENTION, supra note 7, at 205, 207.
 48. Gordon N. Bardos, International Policy in Southeastern Europe: A Diagnosis, in
YUGOSLAVIA UNRAVELED: SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-DETERMINATION, INTERVENTION, supra 
note 7, at 139, 151 (emphasis added) (citing Exec. Order No. 13219, 66 Fed. Reg. 34,777 
(June 27, 2001). See also “UN Suspends Five Top Members of Kosovo Civil Corps,” Agence 
France-Presse, July 6, 2001,  
http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=article&articleid=9918). 
 49. Milica Z. Bookman, Economic Aspects of Yugoslavia’s Disintegration, in
YUGOSLAVIA UNRAVELED: SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-DETERMINATION, INTERVENTION, supra 
note 7, at 117, 131. 
 50. Charles A. Kupchan, Independence for Kosovo: Yielding to Balkan Reality,
FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 14, 18. 
 51. Id. at 17. 
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years prior to the granting of Kosovo’s independence. A government that is 
clannish and corrupt cannot be a good representative of the entire state. In 
this type of government, a minority would not even have the opportunity to 
campaign for a position. This type of government, therefore, could not enter 
into “relations with other states,” the last requirement. These last two 
requirements are interdependent because neither can exist efficiently 
without the other. A government needs interaction with other states to 
survive economically and politically, and other states cannot trust an 
unstable government. Kosovo’s independence should not have been granted 
because these two requirements were not fulfilled.  
Although the Kosovo region could fulfill the first two requirements of 
the Montevideo Convention, it fails in the remaining two. In a sense, the 
third requirement is the most important since a government is the heart of a 
secessionist state. It is the piece that holds the independent state together 
once secession occurs. Granting Kosovo independence circumvented the 
Montevideo Convention and is an insult to the standards that were created. 
It sets a precedent for other states seeking independence to view the 
Montevideo Convention as a flexible standard instead of the customary 
international law that it was meant to be. This is a concern that the 
international community has considered to create “a redrawing of 
international borders which might awaken latent or historical claims 
elsewhere in the region.”52 Similarly, at that time the United States and 
western European states were concerned “that an independent Kosovo will 
serve as a positive example for the numerous self-determination movements 
bent on separation elsewhere in Europe.”53 This apprehension, in and of 
itself, should have been a controlling consideration in declining 
independence. However, when adding to this hesitation, Kosovo’s failure to 
present a complying state, the rejection of independence should have been a 
given. Since these factors were not considered and the international 
community granted Kosovo independence, this result was a direct violation 
of the Montevideo Convention.  
III. KOSOVO’S FAILURE TO FULFILL ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS SET 
OUT BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY’S DECLARATION FOR 
EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES
The first requirement addresses the need for new states to respect the 
U.N. Charter along with other agreements. However, the U.N. Charter 
cannot be applied to Kosovo until it becomes a new state. Thus, to use this 
as part of the analysis of whether independence should have been granted is 
unnecessary.  
 52. Caplan, supra note 34, at 751.  
 53. Id. at 755.  
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The U.N. Charter may be applied to member states that became involved 
in the Kosovo independence conflict. Article 2 is of the greatest importance 
because it outlines the boundaries for member states. Article 2(4) states that 
members must “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state.”54 The actions undertaken by member states, who are concurrently 
members of NATO, were a violation of the U.N. Charter. Specifically, 
states involved in the bombing campaign were in violation because this is a 
direct threat against the territorial integrity of Serbia. It was used to coerce 
Serbia into signing the agreement with respect to Kosovo’s independence. 
Such attacks have already been noted by authors as a breach of “the U.N. 
Charter and even NATO’s own charter.”55 This also interfered with Serbia’s 
domestic jurisdiction and can be attributed as an infringement of Article 
2(7), in particular that the United Nations shall not “intervene in matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”56
Kosovo may have been granted autonomy; however, it was still within 
Serbia’s jurisdiction at the time of the conflict. It was not an independent 
state and thus, any intervention on the part of United Nations members was 
an encroachment on the sovereign state’s rights.  
However, the violations did not end with these two, but in fact were 
found in other sections of the U.N. Charter. Specifically, Article 2(6) states 
that the U.N. will “ensure that states which are not Members of the United 
Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary 
for the maintenance of international peace and security.”57 States were 
required to both refrain from contributing to the violence in Kosovo and 
Serbia and to maintain the peace and security of the region, per Article 2(6). 
In fact, only the Security Council had legitimate reason to get involved in 
the crisis through its authority granted by Article 34. It states that it “may 
investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international 
friction or give rise to a dispute.”58 From all of the cited articles of the U.N. 
Charter, this analysis shows that one common theme arises: the Charter 
limits state’s involvement in matters of international disputes so that the 
broadest powers granted to outside states are those of an “observer.” This is 
a likely conclusion, since any involvement by the states with respect to 
Serbia and Kosovo is in one way or another, a violation.  
The second requirement bound new states to abide by guarantees of 
minority rights with respect to the framework set out by the Conference on 
 54. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.  
 55. Nambiar, supra note 17, at 357.  
 56. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. Intervention is controversial and can have 
unanticipated side effects. Even humanitarian intervention becomes questionable when the 
definition of ‘humanitarian’ is misapplied. See Tom J. Farer, The Ethics of Intervention in 
Self-Determination Struggles, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 382 (2003).  
 57. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 6.  
 58. U.N. Charter art. 34.  
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Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).59 This section deals 
particularly with Kosovo’s actions towards their minorities. Some of the 
most basic rights have been violated, and yet the region was granted 
independence. The concept of minority rights dates back to the Paris Peace 
Conference, which after World War I created “minority treaties . . . and 
applied to the new states of Eastern Europe that harbored substantial 
national minorities.”60 It is a guarantee particularly noteworthy where a 
minority inhabits a region populated by one dominant group. This was the 
case of Kosovo.  
In 1990, the Constitution of the Republic of Kosova stated that it 
guaranteed “full human and citizen’s rights for all individuals.”61 This was a 
declaration made eighteen years prior to the region’s independence. Also, 
within the European Community “extensive provisions for safeguarding the 
rights of ethnic minorities within the boundaries of the new states” were a 
priority.62 If Kosovo upheld its promise to honor the rights of its minority 
citizens, then there should be no argument for not recognizing its 
sovereignty. Yet, the guarantees were not specifically upheld and numerous 
groups of minorities were victims of abuse. Just recently, the reality of this 
abuse has come to light when “[a] two-year international inquiry has 
concluded that the prime minister of Kosovo [Hashim Thaci] led a clan of 
criminal entrepreneurs whose activities included trafficking in organs 
extracted from Serbian prisoners executed during the Kosovo conflict in 
1999.”63 This grim reality is just another indication that it is highly unlikely 
an independent Kosovo will adhere to minority rights. It will be interesting 
to see if the international community will impose stricter standards for 
requiring new states to adhere to the requirements they vowed to follow in 
order to gain their independence.  
Even in 2004, concerns had been noted by U.N. military force 
spokesman Derek Chappell that “‘some in the Kosovo Albanian leadership 
believe that by cleansing all remaining Serbs from the area . . . and 
destroying Serbian cultural sites, they can present the international 
community with a fait accompli.’”64 This was also noted by the 
 59. Declaration, supra note 42. 
 60. Michael Mandelbaum, The Future of Nationalism, in YUGOSLAVIA 
UNRAVELED: SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-DETERMINATION, INTERVENTION, supra note 7, at 41,
50. See Geo A. Finch, The Peace Conference of Paris, 1919, 13 AM. J. INT’L L. 159 (1919), 
for a brief historical overview of the conference that reshaped Europe after World War I.  
 61. Constitutional Declaration Adopted by the Kosovo Assembly, in THE KOSOVO 
CONFLICT: A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY THROUGH DOCUMENTS, supra note 37, at 45. 
 62. Caplan, supra note 34, at 749.  
 63. Doreen Carvajal & Marlise Simons, Report Says Kosovo Prime Minister Led 
Organ Trafficking Network, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/world/europe/16kosovo.html.  
 64. AM. COUNCIL FOR KOS. & LORD BYRON FOUND. FOR BALKAN STUDIES, Kosovo: 
The Score 1999-2009, at 24-25 (2009), available at 
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International Crisis Group as shattering “‘international confidence that the 
Albanians were committed to a tolerant society.”‘65 The actions by 
Kosovo’s majority were a contradiction of the promises enumerated in its 
constitution from 1990. Thus, Kosovo’s constitution was not reflective of its 
actions towards minorities and therefore, there were no guarantees that 
minorities would be protected in the future if independence were granted.  
The third requirement that frontiers change by peaceful means coincides 
with the all-encompassing requirement that new states will not be 
recognized if they are the result of aggression. How can Kosovo have been 
recognized as a new state when its entire existence depended on gaining the 
international community’s attention through its means of aggression? It 
would only be logical that a petitioning state of this type should be denied. 
However, somehow it was not. If there is disbelief that it was the result of 
aggression, Kosovo’s politicians and leading media figures threatened 
violence if independence was not granted. Kosovo’s Prime Minister, Bajram 
Kosumi, threatened that “[i]f Kosovo does not become independent, there 
will be serious consequences.”66 Another politician, Adem Demaci, 
threatened that violence will occur if the “West does not grant 
independence.”67 Similarly, Veton Surroi, an editor-in-chief of a large 
newspaper in the capital of Kosovo, stated that “‘international attention can 
only be obtained through war.”‘68 These are supposed to be some of the 
leaders of the “peaceful” movement attributed to the Kosovo campaign for 
independence. However, the statements show that both the Albanian 
population and the majority leaders in Kosovo held that movement to be a 
farce.  
It should come as no surprise then that the people of Kosovo were 
willing to resort to threats as well. Richard Caplan came to the conclusion 
that “[f]ewer and fewer Albanians are now willing to settle for anything less 
than a total Serbian withdrawal from Kosovo.”69 This was stated prior to 
Kosovo’s independence, yet it is reflective of a non-native’s opinion of the 
situation. There was no chance for a peaceful resolution, especially when 
the KLA preached that the people should “mercilessly hit the enemy for it is 
http://www.balkanstudies.org/sites/default/files/newsletter/Kosovo%20The%20Score%
201999%202009.pdf.
 65. Id. at 25.  
 66. Kupchan, supra note 50, at 17.  
 67. Doug Bandow, former Special Assistant to President Reagan, A Critical Issue 
Back on the Radar Screen, Address Before the American Council for Kosovo (Sept. 28, 
2006), in AM. COUNCIL FOR KOS., RECONSIDERING KOSOVO: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE HELD ON SEPTEMBER 28, 2006 IN WASHINGTON D.C. 47, 51
(2006), available at www.savekosovo.org/documents/Kosovo_Conference_Book_File.pdf.
 68. Caplan, supra note 34, at 752.  
 69. Id. at 746.  
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in this way that we are going to win our freedom.”70 It can only be described 
as a blatant and ruthless statement that shows the extent of aggression the 
secessionist group would take if their wishes were not honored. It is difficult 
to believe that these threats were unknown to decision-making states at the 
time of Kosovo’s independence discussions. Thus, it is only logical to 
assume that they were circumvented for the purposes of granting 
independence. Otherwise, it is contrary to the requirements that a state will 
not be recognized if it is formed as a result of aggression.  
Requirements four and five do not necessitate further analysis since they 
fall within the greater picture emphasized in the first three requirements. 
The fourth requirement, demanding regional stability, has been answered 
through the analysis of whether the region would have a stable government 
and whether minority rights would be protected. From that study, the fourth 
requirement would show that Kosovo could not make a commitment to 
regional stability. The fifth requirement, a commitment to settle by 
agreement issues of regional disputes and state succession, can be answered 
through the same method as that in the third requirement. It is difficult to 
believe that a state that is the result of aggression can be committed to 
peacefully settling regional disputes. You can remove the state from the 
aggression, but you cannot remove the aggression from the State.  
The European Community created the guidelines for new, Eastern 
European, independent states as a response to the conflicts between ethnic 
groups in that region.71 It appears that these guidelines were created to try 
and deter new States from engaging in additional conflict once they were 
granted independence since a state’s “commitment to these principles opens 
the way to recognition by the Community and its Member States and to the 
establishment of diplomatic relations.”72 In a sense, this could be thought of 
as a contract between the secessionist state and the European Community. 
The European Community had a reasonable expectation that the new states 
would honor their end of the bargain and refrain from any acts of violence 
or discriminatory behavior. The European Community would, in turn, grant 
them independence because of this reasonable expectation. However, how 
could the community have expected Kosovo to be able to uphold its end of 
the bargain when it did not meet the requirements in the first place? How 
could the community have even had a reasonable expectation that Kosovo 
would follow the guidelines after independence if it were not able to meet 
them initially?  
 70. Kosova Liberation Army, Statement by the KLA General Staff (Mar. 20, 1999), 
in THE KOSOVO CONFLICT: A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY THROUGH DOCUMENTS, supra note 
26, at 672. 
 71. Declaration, supra note 42.  
 72. Id.
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The guidelines set forth in the Montevideo Convention have been 
accepted as “reflecting customary international law.”73 In order for law to be 
effective it must be predictable. It must contain this quality in order for 
people to have faith in the legal system. Thus, the legal standard for 
independence must be applied consistently in order for states to conform 
their behavior appropriately to fit the guidelines. If this criterion is not 
applied consistently then independence will lack legitimacy. It will be 
sporadic and based on principles that are not enumerated in writing or as 
customary international law. This was the case of Kosovo. It did not fit 
within the legal standards, and the result appeared more impulsive than 
substantiated. At this point it is important to review briefly how the 
Montevideo Convention has not been applied consistently with respect to 
both Quebec and Taiwan, since both of those regions fit the requirements 
but were denied independence.  
IV. CANADA’S CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION TO SECESSION WITH 
RESPECT TO QUEBEC
Quebec is one of ten provinces in Canada and has long vowed to gain 
independence. The French Canadians are the supporters of the secessionist 
movement in Quebec. This is because they “established [a] birthright” in 
Canada when they first settled in the mid-seventeenth century.74 Their view 
of the English Canadians as having a “continuing loyalty to England” 
promoted their desires to create a state that would not forget their French 
heritage.75 One scholar has noted that this history is important when 
“assess[ing] French demands for statehood or independence.”76 The history 
is critical because of Quebec’s perception of emphasis on colonial 
domination, particularly an aversion towards English rule. The Quebecers’ 
claim for independence through self-determination fits precisely within the 
definition enumerated in General Assembly Resolution 2649 that “many 
peoples are still denied the right to self-determination and are subject to 
colonial and alien domination.”77 Quebec is fighting for its right not to be 
subject to Canadian-English governance. If this was its goal, where did it 
fail?  
Referendums in Quebec played a key role in the determination of support 
for independence. The first referendum on sovereignty, held in 1980, 
 73. LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 301 (5th 
ed. 2009). 
 74. Alan S. Alexandroff, The Never-Ending Story: Quebec and the Question of 
National Self-determination, in NO MORE STATES?: GLOBALIZATION, NATIONAL SELF-
DETERMINATION, AND TERRORISM 221, 221 (Richard N. Rosecrance & Arthur A. Stein eds., 
2006).  
 75. Id.
 76. Id.  
 77. G.A. Res. 2649 (XXV), supra note 10.  
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garnered little support, with only 40.4% of Quebecers in favor.78 However, a 
later referendum, which was held beyond 1995, found 49.4% support, a 
number that is crucial to the determination of sovereignty.79 These numbers 
are important because the Canadian government left the issue of secession 
to the Canadian court. The court declared that “a clear majority vote in 
Quebec on a clear question would constitute a moral obligation on the part 
of Canada to negotiate with a Quebec government over the country’s 
future” with respect to independence.80 This majority vote had to constitute 
51%, a number that the province had not yet attained. Yet, it also shows that 
“the court did not accept a unilateral declaration of independence by 
Quebec.”81 Support for Quebec’s independence was not high enough to 
allow negotiations. This hurt the independence movement for many years, 
and it was not until 2005 when an unofficial vote (non-referendum) showed 
54% support for sovereignty, a figure that would give hope to the Quebec 
province in the future.82
In 1998, the Canadian Supreme Court was asked to render an Advisory 
Opinion by Parliament regarding Quebec’s move towards secession. This 
was accomplished in the case of Reference re Secession of Quebec.83 An 
interesting point the court makes is that “[t]he secession of a province from 
Canada must be considered, in legal terms, to require an amendment to the 
Constitution, which perforce requires negotiation.”84 Through this statement 
Canada is binding Quebec, an autonomous province, to the strictures of the 
national constitution. It renders any secessionist action by Quebec, without 
Canada’s approval, unconstitutional. The lack of autonomy given to the 
Quebec government is shown through further statements by the court that 
declare any unilateral acts to be unlawful.85 The actions exercised by the 
Canadian Supreme Court by binding secession to the national constitution, 
at the direction of the country’s national government, could be viewed by 
Quebecers as an interference with their pursuit of sovereignty.  
 78. Alexandroff, supra note 74, at 223-24.  
 79. Id. The 1995 referendum was a pivotal point in Quebec’s quest for independence, 
and since then, there has been much analysis of how this referendum was perceived by the 
public. See Harold D. Clarke, Allan Kornberg & Marianna C. Stewart, Referendum Voting as 
Political Choice: The Case of Quebec, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 345 (2004) (analyzing the 1995 
Quebec referendum using the Nadeau, Martin and Blais Model); see also John Fox, Robert 
Andersen & Joseph Dubonnet, The Polls and the 1995 Quebec Referendum, 24 CAN. J. SOC.
411, 423 (1999) (demonstrating that, with respect to the 1995 referendum and other polls, 
“statistical meta-analysis of polling data can address questions about the trajectory of public 
opinion.”).  
 80. Alexandroff, supra note 74, at 229.  
 81. Id.
 82. Id. at 223 (endnote omitted).  
 83. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).  
 84. Id. ¶ 84.  
 85. Id. ¶ 104.  
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The court also addresses the right of secession with respect to 
international law. It supports its stance against unilateral secession by 
arguing that “international law does not specifically grant component parts 
of sovereign states the legal right to secede unilaterally from their ‘parent’ 
state.”86 With respect to self-determination, the court notes that this right 
“will be exercised by peoples within the framework of existing sovereign 
states and consistently with the maintenance of the territorial integrity of 
those states.”87 Self-determination for Quebec would be “internal” since it 
would be Quebecers’ “pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural 
development” within Canada.88
Further, Quebec could not be granted secession, according to the 
Canadian Supreme Court, because it did not contain a dominated people 
that could qualify under the self-determination doctrine. Specifically, 
Quebecers were not “subject to alien subjugation, domination or 
exploitation.”89 However, taking into account the historical nature of the 
region and the Quebecers’ opinions about the English land, the rejection of 
the claim of alien subjugation could be considered a point of controversy by 
Quebecers. Canadians would argue that Quebecers were not “denied 
meaningful access to government” and thus were not subjugated.90 It 
appears that Quebecer’s participation in the Canadian government is 
particularly noteworthy since history has shown that Quebec has produced 
numerous prime ministers. Thus, the court’s proposition that they can enjoy 
freedom without secession is supported by this point.  
The history of Quebec and the role played by the Canadian Supreme 
Court give credence to the theory that Canada stopped the secessionist 
movement. Canada used its constitution and court as a shield to protect 
itself against Quebec’s secessionist arguments. Through this process, it 
created hurdles that could not be overcome. However, it appears that the 
international community did not object to Canada’s involvement in Quebec 
as it did with Serbia’s involvement in Kosovo. Both states were entitled to 
enjoy its right to sovereignty, and yet only one was actually allowed to 
exercise it.  
Canada and Serbia both exercised control over their prospective 
secessionist regions. They both had integrated, within their constitutions, 
requirements set out for secessionist States. The Canadian court also relies 
on the argument that there is no legal right to unilateral secession.91 A 
 86. Id. ¶ 111 (emphasis added).  
 87. Id. ¶ 122.  
 88. Id. ¶ 126. Specifically, “[t]here is no provision in the Canadian constitution for 
using the referendum procedure, either for constitutional amendment or any other purpose.” 
Peter Leslie, Canada: The Supreme Court Sets Rules for the Secession of Quebec, PUBLIUS,
Spring 1999, at 135, 142.
 89. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. ¶ 154.  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. ¶¶ 154-55. 
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consistent application of international law and standards for independence 
would dictate that both sovereign states should be accorded the right to have 
the international community honor their constitutions. Yet, this is not the 
case.  
Serbia’s constitution implemented criteria for granting an independent 
state in the same manner that Canada undertook in its constitution. Serbia 
stated, “that the status of [a] republic should be reserved for nations (narodi)
as opposed to nationalities (narodnosti),” and that the people of Kosovo did 
not apply by this definition.92 Canada similarly stated that the people of 
Quebec did not fit within their criteria. An argument stands that although 
they were not being “subjugated,” they were being “exploited” by Canada. 
Particularly, the Quebecers wanted to secede in order to enjoy greater 
political and economic freedoms outside of the confines of Canada.93 A 
similar argument can be made for Kosovo Albanians in their claim for 
independence.  
Each sovereign state is entitled to have the international community 
respect its constitution. Some critics may argue that this necessitates limits. 
I will concede to this and argue that limits should only be found when 
another sovereign State’s citizens require a more flexible interpretation of 
the constitution in order for their individual rights to be honored. However, 
at the time of attempted secession neither Kosovo nor Quebec was a 
sovereign state. Per this analysis, either both or neither should have been 
given the ability to contradict Serbia and Canada’s respective constitutions. 
This type of consistent treatment is required if a state’s constitution is to 
have any respect in the international community.  
There is hardly any debate that Quebec has fulfilled the Montevideo 
Convention’s guidelines for a state. It has also been proven in this article 
that Kosovo did not fulfill the guidelines set out by the Convention. The 
only drawback to the Quebecers’ pursuit of sovereignty is their low 
referendum results. Once they reach a number high enough to catch the 
attention of the Canadian government and court, it will be interesting to see 
whether Canada will honor its promise to negotiate regarding the 
secessionist issue. At that point, the international community will have a 
duty to not honor Canada’s constitution, which poses restrictions on 
secession. This is necessary in order for international law to have consistent 
application. There is no justification in allowing some states greater 
constitutional deference and others, none. This is one of the necessary paths 
that must be forged in order for a more stable set of requirements for 
independence to be formed and respected.  
 92. Caplan, supra note 34, at 748.  
 93. Alexandroff, supra note 74, at 222.  
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V.  CHINA’S ACTIONS THREATENED TAIWAN’S RIGHT TO SELF-
DETERMINATION
Self-determination has also proved ineffective in the case of Taiwanese 
independence. This part of the analysis will look at the justifications used to 
decline independence to Taiwan and whether it was based on the same type 
of criteria that granted Kosovo its sovereignty. In the process, China’s 
relationship with Taiwan will be examined and whether its actions 
constituted threats towards Taiwan’s right to self-determination.  
Taiwan has been autonomous for half a century and has exercised 
significant power in the economic sector along with trying to achieve 
independence.94 This pursuit has produced a “strong sense of ‘Taiwan 
identity” on the island, and has enhanced its belief that its region “merits 
international recognition as a sovereign country.”95 However, the island 
itself is not composed of only Taiwanese peoples. Its population includes a 
portion of its neighboring state, the Chinese. In the past, the Chinese have 
had substantial influence in governing the island. However, this influence 
has dissipated and a “growing separatist-leaning Taiwanese leadership” has 
emerged.96 It is this separatist movement that is encouraging other 
Taiwanese to claim their independence.  
There exists debate on whether China can even exercise any sovereign 
rights to Taiwan since Taiwan is an autonomous province. The argument 
that China does not have “sovereignty over the island of Taiwan” since it 
did not acquire title to the land through either treaty or through occupation 
of the territory is problematic if China wants to claim sovereign control over 
the region.97 If China did not occupy Taiwan through either treaty or 
occupation, then it does not have sovereignty over Taiwan. Following from 
this, “[a] state with no sovereignty over a territory cannot have sovereignty 
over the people in the territory.”98 This is significant since there exists the 
possibility that China does not even have a right to invoke sovereignty 
claims. If that were the case, Taiwan would not need to raise claims of a 
right to self-determination since it would already exist as an independent 
State.  
It has not been the case that China has stopped exercising sovereignty 
over Taiwan. In fact, the Chinese constitution regards Taiwanese 
 94. Robert S. Ross, Taiwan’s Fading Independence Movement, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-
Apr. 2006, at 141, 142. The author argues that “[t]he peaceful transformation of relations 
between China and Taiwan will help stabilize eastern Asia, reduce the likelihood of conflict 
between China and the United States, and present an opportunity for Beijing, Taipei, and 
Washington to adjust their defense postures.” Id. at 141.  
 95. Id. at 142.  
 96. Michael D. Swaine, Trouble in Taiwan, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 39, 45. 
 97. Chiang, supra note 1, at 998.  
 98. Id. 
2012] The Right to Self-Determination 515
sovereignty as residing “with the people of ‘China.’”99 This has been a bone 
of contention in the independence movement since China is opposed to the 
drafting of a new constitution and the Taiwanese independence leader, Chen 
Shui-bian, had declared that a “new constitution [should] be drafted by 
2006.”100 This new constitution never evolved due to lack of support in the 
international community and China’s interference with any movement 
towards Taiwanese independence.  
China has been anything but supportive. It has used “provocative missile 
tests near the island, interfering with shipping to Taiwan and provoking the 
United States to deploy two aircraft carrier battle groups to the vicinity of 
Taiwan.”101 China has asserted its claims over Taiwan through its statements 
as well. Particularly, it has made it clear that any change in the country’s 
name from “‘the Republic of China’ to ‘the Republic of Taiwan’” would be 
considered “acts of war.”102 China’s voice against independence has also 
been passed by China’s legislature in 2005 in the Anti-Secession Law, 
“which codified Beijing’s threat to go to war if Taiwan declared 
independence.”103 These codifications can be understood as nothing less 
than a deterrent to Taiwan’s pursuit of independence.  
Such actions by China have in fact produced the effect of containing the 
independence movement on the island. “Voters, reflecting Beijing’s military 
and economic hold on the island, have preferred to accommodate China’s 
opposition to Taiwan’s independence.”104 The waning of support has been 
attributed to China’s threatening response. This has also posed a problem in 
the establishment of referendums on the issue of independence. Ever since 
the People’s Republic of China government established a stronghold in 
China in 1949, there has been a threat “to use force to ‘reunite’ Taiwan with 
China . . . . [specifically] if they did not vote for the candidate of its 
choice.”105 It has been argued that under these circumstances, the “people in 
Taiwan cannot express their free will in a referendum.”106 Additionally, 
 99. Swaine, supra note 96, at 49.  
 100. Emerson M.S. Niou, Understanding Taiwan Independence and its Policy 
Implications, 44 ASIAN SURV. 555, 556 (2004).
 101. Ross, supra note 94. See Andrew Bingham Kennedy, China’s Perceptions of 
U.S. Intentions Toward Taiwan: How Hostile a Hegemon?, 47 ASIAN SURV. 268 (2007) for 
an analysis of United States’ involvement in the Taiwanese independence movement and its 
implications for Chinese diplomacy. 
 102. Ross, supra note 94, at 144.  
 103. Id. at 145.  
 104. Id. at 142. See generally Hung-Mao Tien & Chen-Yuan Tung, Taiwan in 2010: 
Mapping for a New Political Landscape and Economic Outlook, 51 ASIAN SURV. 76 (2011)
(discussing Taiwan’s current foreign policy and its economic relationship with China).  
 105. Chiang, supra note 1, at 1003. Threats against separatist movements impacted 
independence even in 1991. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Beijing Warns Taiwan’s Independence 
Advocates, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/16/world/beijing-
warns-taiwan-s-independence-advocates.html?src=pm. 
 106. Chiang, supra note 1, at 1003. For a discussion of the implications of the Taiwan 
Referendum Law passed on November 28, 2003, see Mily Ming-Tzu Kao, The Referendum 
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“Taiwan’s electorate has consistently rejected a declaration of 
independence” because the risk of going to war with China is too great.107
This then begs the question of why the international community has not 
recognized Taiwan as an oppressed or dominated region, considering 
China’s influence over its political, economic, and societal situation.  
There seem to be three main reasons why the international community 
has not responded with vigorous force to defend Taiwan’s rights. Firstly, 
“Taiwanese independence would [likely] establish a dangerous precedent 
for other potentially secession-minded areas of the country, such as Tibet, 
Xin-jiang, and Inner Mongolia.”108 Secondly, “Washington has long 
considered Taiwan’s moves toward independence a threat to U.S. security 
because [it] could lead to war” with China over the region.109 This second 
concern brings about the proposition that had China’s role in the situation 
not been as threatening to both Taiwan and the international community, the 
right of Taiwanese self-determination would have garnered greater support. 
Lastly, the Taiwan Relations Act has been created by the United States to 
“protect the interests of Taiwan,” and thus, there is no additional need for 
the international community to come to the aid of Taiwan.110 From this, a 
conclusion can be reached that although the people of Taiwan were 
dominated by China, without the support of the international community 
they had no hope of gaining independence. The question then becomes, why 
did the international community respond so differently to Taiwan in 
comparison to Kosovo when both could bring allegations of oppression?  
There is no debate that Taiwan can be classified as a state. It fulfills the 
Montevideo Convention’s requirements and “the elements of the definition 
[of a state].”111 If that is the case, then why has it not been granted 
independence? Scholars have responded to this by putting the blame on 
Taiwan, particularly that “its authorities have not claimed it to be a state, but 
rather part of the state of China.”112 If this is true, then Taiwan has not 
recognized itself as a state for fear that China will inflict violence if it 
makes any movement towards independence.  
China’s interference through overt threats of force is visible in Taiwan’s 
inability to successfully initiate a referendum for independence. The 
General Assembly has made it clear that states cannot “undermine the 
Phenomenon in Taiwan: Solidification of Taiwan Consciousness?, 44 ASIAN SURV. 591
(2004). 
 107. Ross, supra note 94, at 146.  
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electoral processes in any country.”113 When using the General Assembly’s 
proclamations, it is necessary to advance the position that Taiwan can be 
considered to fit within the definition of a country with its own electoral 
process because it has exercised enough autonomy by creating its own 
government, the Republic of China.  
China has interfered with the referendum and has violated the General 
Assembly’s instructions. Yet, the international community has not come to 
support Taiwan’s right to hold a referendum. In fact, they have pulled back. 
Kosovo was able to hold a referendum without any interference from 
Serbia, and yet the international community found it necessary to come to 
Kosovo’s aid even though the electoral process was not undermined. The 
referendum is a crucial step in a state’s assertion of independence since a 
state will not be able to evidence support without it. The international 
community’s inconsistent support of referendums shows that there needs to 
be a more reliable application if all states that fulfill the Montevideo 
Convention’s requirements are to be given the ability to exercise their right 
to self-determination.  
Kosovo did not fulfill the Montevideo Convention’s requirements and 
yet it was acknowledged as an independent state. This could not have been 
accomplished without assistance by the international community. It has 
already been noted earlier that Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter was violated 
when NATO inflicted a bombing campaign against Serbia in order to 
compel the country to concede to the secessionist agreement in favor of 
Kosovo.114 However, it becomes questionable why NATO or the 
international community did not exert force towards China when China 
explicitly posed the ultimatum that if Taiwan makes any movement towards 
independence it will be considered an act of war.115
Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter declares that states shall not intervene 
“in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state” was also respected with China’s assertion of sovereignty over 
Taiwan.116 The international community, however, did not respect Serbia’s 
right to assert sovereignty over Kosovo. Both claimed the territories to be 
within their sovereign jurisdiction, and yet only one was allowed to exercise 
control without intervention. If a secessionist region chooses to pursue 
independence, and its governing state wishes to exercise its right of 
sovereign control, the international community cannot pick and choose 
when it will intervene. It must either consistently allow all states to exercise 
control or prevent them. By allowing China to exercise control and 
 113. G.A. Res. 46/130, supra note 25, ¶ 6. For the purposes of this analysis, a 
referendum is considered a part of the electoral process since it is representative of a people’s 
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preventing Serbia from doing the same, the international community has 
claimed the authority to be the ultimate arbiter of when the right to 
independence may be exercised.  
Comparing how Kosovo and Taiwan’s desire for independence was 
handled, a cynic would conclude that Taiwan was denied independence 
because China posed a greater threat if angered than would Serbia. Thus, 
the standards set forth in the Montevideo Convention are more flexible in 
the Kosovo application, since upsetting Serbia would have minimal impact 
on the international community. The opposite is true for Taiwan. 
Additionally, the international community’s involvement in ensuring the 
process for referendums is more stringent with states that are not 
threatening. These inconsistencies provide evidence that smaller and less 
powerful sovereign states are not provided with the same rights when 
secessionist states try to exercise independence. Until a more reliable set of 
standards is created, aggressor states seeking independence will consistently 
be provided with greater opportunity to exercise sovereignty.  
CONCLUSION
When reconciling the secessionist movements of Kosovo, Quebec, and 
Taiwan, and the justifications used to accept or reject claims for 
independence, the conclusion can be reached that there does not exist a 
defined set of standards that are applied on a consistent basis. Rather, as one 
scholar accurately stated, the “recognition of a people’s status as a nation-
state is conferred by the international community and is highly subject to 
the calculations and interests of the most influential powers involved.”117
Kosovo’s declaration of independence is a product of this conclusion. 
Serbia was a less influential and powerful country than both Canada and 
China, so its sovereignty was not respected. Had Taiwan or Quebec been 
given independence, the international community would have been faced 
with two powerful nations that could have destroyed the interests that were 
at stake for those countries granting independence to their secessionist 
regions.  
From this perspective, a clearer set of standards needs to be established. 
Since it is evident that the Montevideo Convention is not applied 
consistently, the international community should create new requirements 
that are more detailed and that take into account a state’s sovereign right to 
defend its territory from secession. Within these requirements, a secessionist 
state’s assertion of self-determination should be defined, keeping in mind 
that this right can be revoked if the secessionist group resorts to any threats 
or violence towards other ethnic groups within the region.  
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The overarching conclusion is that there need to be better guidelines in 
order to achieve more consistent results. Granting independence to some 
states that do not fit the requirements, while denying it to others that do fit 
the requirements, does not allow the international community to feel 
comfortable with the established standards. It in turn leads to insecurity in 
the international legal system and the belief that other factors are the basis 
for granting independence.  

